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Abstract
We develop a theoretical model in which firms are either private or state-owned.
When firms become insolvent, the government can intervene with general mea-
sures, like subsidies, or by nationalizing firms. The government only intervenes
when the bankruptcy of a firm entails social costs. In a stylized model, we an-
alyze how government interventions affect allocative and productive efficiency.
Nationalization of private firms in case unprofitable investments were made,
leads to increased allocative efficiency despite private ownership. The effort
level chosen by the managers working for firms is also affected by government
intervention with an impact on productive efficiency.
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1 Introduction
The demand for and implementation of government interventions is one of the main
characteristics of the most recent global financial crisis. In the banking and insurance
sectors, for example, Fortis, HypoRealEstate, Goldman Sachs and AIG were either
nationalized or bailed out. On the other hand, governments try to help firms with
general measures, like tax reductions or, as in Germany or the United Kingdom, a
bonus when buying a new car. The current popularity of government intervention
contrasts with the period of transformation of economies after the collapse of com-
munism, when privatization was used to reduce the role of the government. In this
paper we look at what transition economics could teach us about interventions by
the government in the financial crisis.
Our paper focuses on two efficiency arguments commonly used in transition eco-
nomics. The first one, productive efficiency, claims that production is more efficient
in a private firm because better incentives can be given to managers and employees.
The intuition is that private firms face a larger risk of liquidation than public firms,
and managers thus face a larger risk of losing their job when choosing an effort level
that is not high enough. The second argument, allocative efficiency, claims that pub-
lic firms are socially more efficient because the government cares about social welfare
and internalizes externalities, whereas the private owners just maximize their pay-
off. The demand for government intervention, to mitigate the consequences of the
financial crisis, is often motivated by the second argument, while the first one is not
discussed.
In transition economics it is argued that a privatization enhances efficiency by
2
hardening the budget constraint.1 Privatization, however, does not eliminate the
soft budget constraint. Schaffer (1989, 1998) and Maskin (1999) argue that the
government is unable to stick ex post to a hard budget constraint and Schleifer and
Vishny (1994) point out that the government may rescue firms in return for political
support. In line with this, Lin and Li (2008) explain soft budget constraints by
the existence of policy burdens on enterprises, such as keeping redundant workers
or providing retirement and other social services. Similarly, in the financial crisis
governments helped private firms, like the car industry, as well as (semi-) public
firms, like FannieMae and FreddieMac.
We argue that there are two possible forms of government intervention. The first
is general intervention, in the form of for example tax reductions or deductions, and
the other one consists of bailouts and nationalizations. One difference between the
two is that nationalizations are, logically, impossible in the case of public firms. A
difference for the board of directors of a private firm is that general intervention is
normally preferred over a nationalization, as the latter may imply that they lose their
jobs or that they have to repay their bonuses. Managers and workers have similar
incentives, since nationalization may imply that they have to repay their bonuses or
that they may lose the shares they own in their company. The government, however,
prefers nationalization over general intervention in cases where the latter becomes
politically too costly. We contend that this is the case when firms have grown too
large, when nationalization is politically more feasible since the ownership of the firm
1The concept of soft budget constraint was developed by Kornai (1980, 1986, 1998). For a review
of the theoretical and empirical literature see, for example, Maskin (1999), Dewatripont and Roland
(2000), Maskin and Xu (2001), Kornai et al. (2003) or Laffont and Tirole (1991).
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changes, and this can be used as a justification towards the electorate.2
Our main findings are that allocative efficiency is higher in private firms and that
productive efficiency can be equal in public and private firms. These results differ
substantially from those in the existing literature. Schmidt and Schnitzer (1993)
and Schmidt (1996), for example, argue that public ownership of firms enhances
allocative efficiency by subsidizing unprofitable public firms when liquidation of these
firms would entail externalities. This subsequently decreases productive efficiency,
as managers and workers run a smaller risk of losing their job. We argue, however,
that subsidization or other governmental interventions are sometimes unfeasible and
then managers and workers in public and private firms face the same risk so that
productive efficiency in both sectors is the same.
Moreover, the government can also intervene in favor of private firms (also see
Kornai 2001), and we show that this possibility implies that allocative efficiency
can be bigger in private firms. This follows from the fact that the subsidization of
unprofitable public firms implies that risky investment in public firms takes place
more often, so there might be overinvestment from a social welfare point of view.3
Allocative efficiency can therefore be higher in private firms since less overinvestment
takes place, as risky investments could induce painful nationalizations.
Our results on allocative and productive efficiency thus contrasts with those of the
existing literature, and add to the literature on transition economics. These results
also imply that government interventions in the financial crisis can have detrimen-
2Additionally, nationalization can be less costly as it can be done with (partial) expropriation.
3One could argue that the (partially) public firms FannieMae and FreddieMac overinvested in
mortgages.
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tal effects on allocative and productive efficiency, as it can lower the incentives for
managers and employees and increase overinvestment.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the formal
model and Section 3 the socially optimal outcome that we use as a benchmark in
our analysis. Sections 4 and 5 discuss the choices made in public and private firms,
respectively. Section 6 contains a discussion of the results and several extensions and
Section 7 concludes.
2 The Model
In this section we introduce and compare two governance structures for a firm. We
assume that either the firm is owned by a private holding company or it is part
of a government agency. In the economy, there may be more holding companies
and government agencies each controlling several firms, but we do not model this
explicitly.
Each firm employs managers and employees, who have to decide on the amount of
effort they put into their work. The investment opportunities and thus firm values
are influenced by this effort level. The standard approach to giving managers and
employees the right incentives is to link salaries to the firm’s performance. Stock
options, however, are not a good possibility to shape the incentives as this exposes
managers and employees to a considerable risk in their earnings, while they have only
limited influence on stock prices. We therefore assume that they get a flat incentive
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scheme.4
Incentives are also shaped by career concerns. A liquidation of a firm implies that
the managers and employees lose their jobs, while nationalization may also result in
job-losses due to accompanying reorganizations. A liquidation or a nationalization
can, moreover, be interpreted as signals about the managers ability, lowering future
job prospects.
The board of directors or the government agency takes two decisions: an investment
and a liquidation decision. We assume that they maximize firm-value, either because
they have stock options or are owners of the firm (in the case of the private firm) or
due to political pressure or career concerns (in the case of the public firm).
A potential liquidation of a firm can imply negative external effects, and these social
costs are not taken into account by a profit-maximizing owner but may induce the
government to intervene. As we mention in the Introduction, negative externalities
are associated with the social burdens of a firm (see, e.g. Lin and Li 2008), indepen-
dently of whether it is a public or a private firm (see Kornai 2001). For example,
a high level of long-lasting unemployment associated with the liquidation of large
public or private companies could be associated with social unrest in the absence of
an adequate social security system (Hardy 1992). A big bank in financial distress
may also generate contagion effects on other banks or financial institutions, causing
macroeconomic and political instability. The liquidation of other public or private
firms, however, may result in negligible social costs. The government’s objective is
to avoid social costs of a potential liquidation.
4See Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1987) for a formal model of this argument.
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Managers and employees choose 
effort level and type of investment 
environment is realized
Board of directors or 
government agency take 
investment decision
In a risky investment environment:
nature determines whether
investment is profitable
Board of directors or 
government agency take 
liquidation decision
Government takes 
intervention decision
Figure 1: Time structure of the model.
The game extends over several periods, for an illustration see Figure 1. In period
1, the manager chooses an effort level e ≥ 0. This effort level is neither observed
by the board of directors nor by the government agency. In period 2, the type of
the investment environment is realized and observed by the board of directors or the
government agency. After that, an investment decision is made. The investment I >
0 can be used, for example, to modernize or to extend the firm. With probability p(e),
the investment environment is “safe” and with probability 1 − p(e), the investment
environment is “risky”. The probability p(e) is increasing and strictly concave in the
level of effort e, with 0 < p(e) < 1 for all e.
In case the investment was made in a safe environment, investing is always prof-
itable. In a risky environment, however, the investment is profitable only with prob-
ability α, with α ∈ [0, 1]. The investment payoffs are the net present value of the
firm. The board of directors or the government agency observe these payoffs and
they (not the managers and employees) have to decide whether to close down and
liquidate the firm or to keep it in operation. In the last period, the government
decides whether and how to intervene.
7
Now consider the value of the firm before the government takes its decision. These
values are known to the government, the board of directors and the government
agency. If an investment is profitable then firm value will be V > 0, while an
unprofitable investment will yield a firm value of V < 0. In contrast, if no investment
was made, the value of the firm will be 0.
The board or the agency can choose to close down the firm, that is, to liquidate
its assets. The value of the liquidated assets of a firm where no investment is made is
given by V L > 0, while this value is V L + I when an investment is made. We assume
that V > V L + I, thus when an investment was made in a firm, and this investment
is profitable, the firm’s value is larger than its liquidation value.
The social cost that the liquidation of a firm may generate is denoted by ∆ > 0.
The government, the board of directors and the government agency know whether
liquidation entails social costs but these social cost are unobservable to the manager
and employees of the firm. If the decision is to liquidate the firm, the government
may intervene with general measures, like tax reductions or by nationalizing the
private firm.
The decision of the manager
The manager and employees of the firm choose a level of effort e. Independently
of the governance structure of the firm, they get a fixed salary w. When the firm
is closed down or when a private firm is nationalized, the manager incurs a utility
loss ∆m > 0. This utility loss is related to the risk of losing a job and other career
concerns. Let x ∈ {0, 1} denote the final decision whether to close down the firm
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(x = 0) or to keep it in operation (x = 1). Then the manager’s utility U is given by
U = w − (1− x)∆m − e
Note that the manager does not know whether the firm will be closed down when
he chooses his effort level. The manager thus chooses e to maximize his expected
utility.
The decisions of the board and the agency
The board of directors and the government agency make two decisions. In the second
period, they have to decide whether to invest in the firm. For this decision, the
board and the agency observe whether there is a safe investment environment. In
a safe environment, investing is always profitable and we therefore assume that in a
safe environment, the board and the agency always decide to invest. In the second
decision, the board and the agency first observe the firm value and then have to
decide whether to liquidate the firm.
The board and the agency maximize firm value, but do not take possible social
costs into account when taking the liquidation decision. If the value of a firm is
smaller than its liquidation value, then a profit-maximizing owner will shut it down
and sell off its assets. Without government intervention, the firm is thus closed down
when an investment was not profitable (since V L + I > V ) or when no investment
was made (since V L > 0). When an investment is profitable, however, the firm’s
value is larger than its liquidation value. We therefore assume that the board or the
agency only plans to close down firms in which unprofitable or no investments were
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made.
The decision of the government
After the board of directors or the government agency plans to close down the firm,
the government may intervene and avoid a shutdown of the firm. The government
may intervene with general measures, for example with tax reductions or cheap
loans, or by nationalizing the private firm. When general measures are used, this
intervention can be seen as a transfer to the board or the agency, depending on the
continuation of the firm’s operations. When an investment was made, this transfer
should be V L + I −V to make the board or agency indifferent between closing down
and continuing. When no investment was made, this transfer is V L. For public as
well as private firms, we assume that ∆ > V L + I − V , so the social costs of a
liquidation are higher than the costs of avoiding one.
The government could alternatively nationalize the firm. Note that this is only
relevant for private firms. In this case, we assume that the government pays the
board of directors an amount V F and the firm continues in operation as a public
firm. We assume that V L + I − V > V F > V L. When an investment was made, the
costs of a nationalization V F are lower than the costs of general measures V L+I−V ,
because the government can, for example, use expropriation. The political costs are
also lower, since the government owns the company after nationalization, and this
change in ownership can be presented to the electorate as a justification. When
no investment was made, however, general measures cost less and such an electoral
justification is less important. The costs of nationalization V F are, therefore, lower
than the costs V L of general measures, as the government then does not take on
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additional entrepreneurial and social responsibilities.
3 The socially optimal allocation
In this section, we consider the unconstrained first-best allocation. We use this as a
benchmark for the allocations in public and private firms. In the following, we first
look at the government’s decision, then at the investment decision and finally at the
manager’s effort.
From a social point of view, the government should neither intervene when there are
no social costs of liquidation, nor when the firm continues to operate. A general in-
tervention should thus only be conducted when a firm is unprofitable, and liquidation
would entail social costs.
Now, consider the investment decision. In a safe investment environment, investment
is always profitable and should therefore always be undertaken. In a risky environ-
ment, an investment should only be made when it has a higher expected payoff than
not investing. These payoffs, however, depend on the social costs of closing down the
firm. In case liquidation does not entail social costs, not investing and subsequently
closing down the firm would yield the liquidation value of the firm. Investing would
be profitable with probability α, but an unprofitable investment would again yield
the liquidation value of the firm, net of the investment costs. An investment should
thus be made when
αV + (1− α)
(
V L + I
)
− I > V L.
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That is, when V − V L > I, i.e. when the firm value V after a successful investment
is high enough. In case liquidation entails social costs, not investing would yield a
payoff equal to zero. Investing would again be profitable with probability α, but an
unprofitable investment would yield a loss V . An investment should thus be made
when
αV + (1− α)V − I > 0.
That is, when αV + (1 − α)V > I, i.e. when the firm value V after a successful
investment is high enough and the loss V after an unsuccessful investment not too
big.
Since the investment decision depends on whether liquidation would entail social
costs, the welfare-maximizing effort level of the manager also does. In case liquidation
does not entail social costs, the welfare-maximizing effort level satisfies
e = arg max
e
p(e)V + (1− p(e)) max
{
αV + (1− α)
(
V L + I
)
− I, V L
}
− e
and this effort level is uniquely characterized by
p′(e) min
{
(1− α)
(
V − V L
)
+ αI, V − V L
}
= 1.
In case there are social costs of liquidation, the effort level should satisfy
e = arg max
e
p(e)V + (1− p(e)) max
{
αV + (1− α)V − I, 0
}
− e
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and this welfare-maximizing effort level is uniquely characterized by
p′(e) min
{
(1− α)
(
V − V
)
+ I, V
}
= 1.
In both cases, the manager’s effort level equalizes the marginal social benefits and
the marginal costs of effort.
4 The public firm
We solve the model by backward induction, first looking at the government’s decision,
then the agency’s and finally at the effort level chosen by the manager.
The government neither intervenes when there are no social costs of liquidation, nor
when the firm continues in operation. A general intervention thus only takes place
when the government agency plans a liquidation that would entail social costs.
When the government agency decides on investment, the agency knows whether a
liquidation would entail social costs and whether there is a safe or a risky investment
environment. When the investment decision is made, the agency also takes the
social costs of a potential liquidation into account, since these costs influence the
intervention decision of the government in the case of a potential liquidation and
thus the investment’s expected payoff.
In the case without social costs of liquidation, the agency decides to invest when
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the expected payoff after investing is larger than without, thus when
p(e)V + (1− p(e))
[
αV + (1− α)
(
V L + I
)]
− I > V L.
That is, when
(
V − V L − I
)
(p(e)(1− α) + α) > 0. Since V > V L + I this is always
the case and the agency chooses to invest when there are no social costs of liquida-
tion. When there are social costs of liquidation and the agency plans a liquidation,
the government intervenes such that the government agency is indifferent between
continuing and closing down the firm. In other words, the payoffs with and without
investment are the same as in the case discussed above, and it thus follows that the
agency also invests when liquidations are costly. The agency thus always chooses
to make an investment. In Section 3, however, we show that under certain circum-
stances, it is socially optimal not to invest in a firm. Thus from a social point of
view, overinvestment takes place in the public firm.
Now consider the decision of the manager. The manager will lose his job if the firm
is shut down, that is, when there are no social costs of liquidation and the firm is not
profitable. The manager does not know whether there are social costs of liquidation,
but has a prior belief qG about the probability that there are. As we have discussed
above, the government agency always decides to invest. With probability p(e), there
is a safe investment environment and the firm is always profitable after investment.
With probability 1 − p(e), however, this investment is made in a risky environment
and with a probability (1 − α) the firm will make a loss after the investment. The
manager thus anticipates a chance (1−p(e))(1−α)(1−qG) of losing his job. Therefore,
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the manager chooses e such that
e = arg max
e
w − (1− p(e))(1− α)(1− qG)∆m − e
and the utility-maximizing effort level is uniquely characterized by
p′(e)(1− α)(1− qG)∆m = 1. (1)
Note that for a higher qG, the prior belief of the manager that there are social costs
of liquidation, the manager chooses a lower effort level e.
5 The private firm
We solve the model backwards, first looking at the government’s decision, then the
board’s and finally at the effort level chosen by the manager.
First note that the government neither intervenes when there are no social costs
of liquidation, nor when the firm continues to operate. In case an unprofitable
investment was made and the board of directors plans a socially costly liquidation,
the government chooses nationalization instead of the implementation of general
measures since
∆ + V − V F > ∆− (V L + I − V ),
that is, since V L + I > V F . In case no investment was made and the board plans
a socially costly liquidation, the government prefers general measures over national-
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ization since
∆− V L > ∆− V F ,
that is, since V F > V L.
When the board of directors decides on investment, the board knows whether there
is a safe or a risky investment environment and it knows whether liquidation would
entail social costs. In a safe environment, the board invests in the company since
V > V L. In a risky environment and if liquidation does not entail social costs,
the board chooses to invest when the expected payoff after investing is larger than
without, that is, when
αV + (1− α)
(
V L + I
)
− I > V L.
Since V > V L + I, the board invests. In section 2.1, however, we show that it
is socially optimal to invest only when α(V − V L) > I, so in a risky investment
environment without social costs of liquidation, overinvestment takes place in the
private firm.
In a risky investment environment with socially costly liquidations, the board
chooses to invest when
αV + (1− α)V F − I > V L.
That is, when αV + (1− α)V F − V L > I. So the board will invest if the firm values
V after a successful and V F after an unprofitable investment are large enough. In
this case, it is socially optimal to invest when αV + (1−α)V > I. When V F = V +
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V L/(1−α), these two conditions are equivalent, and the government can thus induce
private firms to choose the optimal level of investment. When V F is smaller than
this value, the board of directors invests too little, since potential nationalizations
after investments are too costly, while with a V F bigger than this value, the board
would invest too much.
Now consider the decision of the manager. The manager will lose his job if the
firm is shut down, that is, when there are no social costs of liquidation and the
firm is not profitable. The manager does not know whether there are social costs
of liquidation, but has a prior belief qP about the probability that there are. As
we have discussed above, the board of directors chooses to invest in the firm when
there is a safe investment environment and the firm is always profitable after this
investment. However, the manager does not know whether the board will invest in
a risky environment, nor whether such an investment will be profitable. From the
discussion above it follows that in a risky investment environment without social costs
of liquidation the board of directors always invests and, by assumption, an investment
is profitable with probability α. So the manager knows that there is a probability of
(1 − qP )(1 − α) of losing his job in a risky environment without social costs. When
there are social costs of liquidation, the manager expects that there is a probability
µ ∈ [0, 1] that the board invests in a risky environment and, by assumption, such
an investment is profitable with probability α. The manager knows that there is a
probability of qP µ(1 − α) of losing his job in a risky environment with social costs
of liquidation. Since the probability that there is a risky investment environment
is 1 − p(e), the manager faces a probability of (1 − p(e))(1 − α)[(1 − qP ) + qP µ].
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Therefore, the manager chooses e such that
e = arg max
e
w − (1− p(e))(1− α)
[
(1− qP ) + qP µ
]
∆m − e
and the utility-maximizing effort level is uniquely characterized by
p′(e)(1− α)
[
(1− qP ) + qP µ
]
∆m = 1. (2)
Note that for a higher qP , the prior belief of the manager that there are social costs
of liquidation, the manager chooses a lower effort level e.
6 Discussion and extensions
In this section, we compare the investment levels in the public and private firm and
then we discuss the effort levels chosen in both cases. As a robustness check, we
then change the assumption that the board of directors of a private firm observes
the social costs of a potential liquidation. Finally, we extend the model by additional
periods to discuss the effect that an intervention has on effort levels.
Allocative efficiency: Investment levels
Now look at the investment levels IG and IP chosen by the government agency and
the board of directors, respectively. Recall that the agency always chooses to invest,
so IG = I. The board, however, chooses IP = I only in (i) a safe investment
environment or (ii) a risky environment when liquidation does not entail social costs
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or (iii) a risky environment when liquidation entails social costs where V and V F
are big enough. Moreover, when the government chooses V F = V + V L/(1 − α),
investment levels are socially optimal in private firms where a potential liquidation
would entail social costs. Public firms, however, always invest and there is thus
more investment in public firms than socially optimal so that allocative efficiency is
lower than in private firms. These considerations are summarized in the following
proposition.
Proposition 1 Private firms achieve higher allocative efficiency than public firms.
This result contrasts with the existing literature. In Schmidt and Schnitzer (1993)
and Schmidt (1996), for example, allocative efficiency is higher in public firms, since
socially costly liquidations are avoided. In the existing literature, however, it is often
assumed that public firms cannot be liquidated or that the government cannot avoid
the liquidation of private firms. We contend, on the contrary, that governments can
also intervene in private firms. Additionally, the investment incentives are often not
studied explicitly, and the results on allocative efficiency are only based on liquidation
decisions, even though public ownership can distort the investment decision.
Productive efficiency: Effort levels
Now look at the manager’s effort levels eG and eP in the cases where the manager
is working for either a public or a private firm, respectively. The levels of effort are
implicitly given by first order conditions. That is, for the public firm p′(eG)(1 −
α)(1 − qG)∆m = 1, and for the private firm p′(eP )(1 − α)[(1 − qP ) + qP µ]∆m = 1.
Note that eP is bigger than eG if and only if qP + qP µ > 1− qG.
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In the existing literature, it is often assumed that the managers and employees of
private firms believe that the government does not intervene in case of a liquidation
of the firm, so qP = 0, while the managers and employees of the public firm believe
that the government does, so qG = 1. In this case, clearly eP is higher than eG.
This is a typical extreme case analyzed, for example, in the model of governance
structures in Schmidt and Schnitzer (1993). In private firms, managers and employees
choose higher effort levels because there is a bigger probability that otherwise they
will lose their jobs and productive efficiency is thus higher in private firms. In the
Introduction, however, we argue that the liquidation of private firms can also entail
social costs and that the government can also intervene in favor of public firms. We
therefore additionally consider the case qP = qG.
When the managers of private and public firms believe that the government will
not intervene after a potential liquidation of these firms, that is if qP = qG = 0, then
the effort levels are the same in both cases and are defined by p′(e)(1 − α)∆m =
1. This could be the case when, for example, a competition authority prevents
interventions or when liquidations do not entail social costs. The latter could be the
case when the firms are small. When for instance banks are small their liquidation
would not pose systemic risks and thus entail limited or no social costs, so the
government would not intervene after a liquidation. When managers and employees
of public and private firms, however, believe that liquidation might entail social costs,
that is if qP = qG => 0, then the manager’s effort level is higher in the private firm
than in the public firm, This is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Private firms achieve higher productive efficiency than public firms
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only when governmental interventions are possible.
When the government does not intervene, neither in public nor in private firms,
managers and employees face the same risk of losing their jobs and thus choose the
same effort levels, so that productive efficiency is the same in public and private
firms. When the government may intervene, however, the managers and employees
of private firms face a higher risk and productive efficiency is then higher in private
firms.
Social costs not known to board of directors
In this part, we assume that the board of directors does not know whether liquidation
of the private firm would entail social costs. This captures the idea that the public
differs from the private sector in that it knows whether liquidation entails social costs.
However, it does not observe whether there is a safe investment environment, while
in the private sector the liquidation costs are not known but it is known whether the
investment environment is safe or not. In this subsection we show that the results
do not change qualitatively, only the notation is slightly more complicated.
First note that the intervention decision made by the government remains the
same after changing this assumption, so we can use the results discussed in Section
5. Now look at the investment decision. The board of directors does not know
whether there are social costs of liquidating the firm, but has a prior belief about the
probability that there are. To economize on notation, assume this is the same prior qP
the manager has. When there is a safe investment environment, the board invests.
When the board invests in a risky environment, the expected value of the firm is
αV +(1−α)V F−I if there are social costs of liquidation and αV +(1−α)
(
V L + I
)
−I
21
if there are no social costs. The board therefore invests if
qP
[
αV + (1− α)V F − I
]
+
(
1− qP
) [
αV + (1− α)
(
V L + I
)
− I
]
> V L.
That is, when αV + qP (1− α)V F −
(
α + qP − αqP
)
I >
(
α + qP − αqP
)
V L. So the
board invests if the firm values V and V F after investment are large enough. Note
that the manager can also make these calculations and therefore knows whether the
firm invests in a risky environment. In case it does, the manager’s effort level is given
by (2) with µ = 1, otherwise (2) with µ = 0.
After an intervention
In this subsection, we look at an extension with two periods in which the government
intervened in the first period and we subsequently look at the incentives in the second
period. Crucial for this is that, after an intervention, the manager learns that a
liquidation of the firm would entail social costs. In the following discussion, we
assume that an intervention took place in the first period. Note that in the period
after an intervention, the government has the same incentives to intervene as before.
Nationalization, however, changes the incentives of the government since a private
firm becomes public, making nationalization no longer an option. The investment
decision after an intervention is also the same since also in the first stage the agency
and the board of directors by assumption know whether liquidation of the firm would
entail social costs. Nationalizing a private firm thus induces overinvestment. After
an intervention, the manager of a public firm also adjusts (i.e. increases) his prior
belief of the probability qG that liquidation would entail social costs and (1) implies
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that he chooses a lower effort level. The manager who works for a nationalized firm
knows that liquidation is unlikely, and (1) again implies that he chooses a low effort
level. Finally, an intervention implies that the manager of a private firm also adjusts
(i.e. increases) his prior belief of the probability qP that liquidation would entail
social costs and from (2) it follows that he chooses a lower effort level, too.
7 Concluding remarks
We develop a theoretical framework in which there are public and private firms
and a government. When a firm becomes insolvent, the government can intervene
with general measures like tax reductions or by nationalizing the private firm. The
government only intervenes when the bankruptcy of a firm entails social costs and
these interventions may therefore enhance allocative efficiency. Since the government
can intervene in public as well as private firms, allocative efficiency of private firms
does not need to be smaller. Nationalization takes place when there are social costs
of a potential liquidation and loss-making investments were made in a private firm.
This implies that there is less overinvestment in private firms, and for this reason
allocative efficiency can actually be higher in private firms.
The model also suggests which impact a potential intervention has on the effort
levels chosen by the managers working for the firms. When the managers of private
and public firms believe that liquidation of these firms entails no social costs or that
government intervention is unfeasible then the effort levels and productive efficiency
are the same in public and private firms. On the other hand, when the managers
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of private and public firms believe that liquidation of these firms entails social costs
then the manager’s effort level is higher in the private firm than in the public firm.
Managers and employees of private firms choose higher effort levels because there is
a bigger probability that otherwise they will lose their jobs.
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